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Connection Meets Disruption:
The China-Europe Freight
Train and the War in Ukraine
BY XIANGMING CHEN

The China-Europe Freight Train
(CEFT), which inaugurated its run
from the megacity of Chongqing
in southwestern China to Europe’s
largest river port of Duisburg in
western Germany in 2011, has roared
through its first decade. With 82
routes currently connecting nearly
100 Chinese cities and around 200
cities across 24 European countries
and more than a dozen Central, East,
and Southeast Asian countries, the
CEFT has formed a vast transcontinental freight network spanning both
ends of Eurasia. As the CEFT runs into

its second decade, it has already sent
around 60,000 trains cumulatively
between Europe, China, and parts
of East Asia and Southeast Asia by
October 2022. Every day now, around
40 freight trains carrying hundreds of
containers and other forms of cargo
shipments run east and west across
Eurasia, with extended rail-sea and
rail-river intermodal shipping across
the Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean
seas and along the Rhine and Yangtze
Rivers. The scope and strength of
the CEFT-induced logistical connectivity along Eurasia has hit an all-time

A freight train carrying medical supplies bound for Madrid departs the city of Yiwu, in
China’s Zhejiang Province, in June 2020.Photographer: Lyu Bin/Xinhua/Getty Images

high since I wrote about its then state
of development in “Connectivity,
Connectivity, Connectivity: Has the
China-Europe Freight Train Become
a Winning Run?” as the cover story
for the August-September 2021 issue
of this magazine. Reading that and
this article in tandem will provide a
broad and fast-moving picture of how
a transcontinental freight rail system
has developed with great rapidity,
extensive reach, and considerable
success, against a serious geopolitical
risk posed by the war in Ukraine.

O

n 24 August 2022, exactly six
months after Russian tanks
entered eastern Ukraine, a
freight train left a railway station near
the landlocked megacity of Chengdu
in southwestern China and arrived in
Saint Petersburg, Russia on the Baltic
Sea 12 days later. The train carried 50
containers loaded with copper sheets,
water heaters, and laser cutters worth
$1.67 million and ran 6,207 km through
the land port of Alashanhou (Alatau
Pass), Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. This
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journey highlights the connective scope of the
CEFT across Eurasia on one hand, and the disruptive effect of the Ukraine war on the train on the
other, due to Russia’s expansive location bridging
China and Europe. This essay explores the collision
between the strong connection of the CEFT and the
disruption caused by the war, and its broader geopolitical implications for the CEFT-induced transcontinental freight network spanning Eurasia.
Russia’s war against Ukraine since 24 February
2022 has become a roadblock to the CEFT and
has the potential to be a longer-term disruption
to parts of this transcontinental freight network.
Russia looms large from its central role in intermediating the CEFT, besides being the start and end
point of many freight trains as the final terminus.
This is largely dictated by Russia’s location and
vast territory straddling both Europe and Asia and
the connective power of its long-running TransSiberian Railway. Over 2011-21, Russia accounted
for 37 per cent of the total number of CEFTs, ahead
of Germany at 24.3 per cent and Poland at 23.4
per cent.1 Western sanctions led many European
companies to avoid Russia. While Ukraine did not
join the CEFT until 2020 and accounted for only
0.2 per cent of CEFT flows by the end of 2021, a
number of CEFTs ran west through Russia and
then Kiev and Chop, a Ukrainian city near the
borders of Slovakia and Hungary, to enter the EU.
This route came to a halt when the war started.
Is the war in Ukraine really disruptive to the
CEFT, and how? The disruption appears obvious
and major, as the war is the biggest on the
European continent in eight decades, with severe
geopolitical consequences if we focus narrowly
on the geography of Russia and, to a much lesser
extent, Ukraine as a pass-through place for a large
percentage of CEFTs. The disruption may also
be real as the war poses expected risks to logistics companies and freight forwarders who would
have to raise the insurance premiums charged
to their clients. However, the CEFT’s extensive
geographic coverage, coupled with the combined
diversity and flexibility of its many routes and
linked cities, may offer ways and means to bypass
or mitigate the geographically concentrated
risks of the Ukraine war. To assess how the collision between the CEFT’s connection and the
war’s disruption plays out across Eurasia, I first
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FIGURE 1

The growth of the China-Europe freight train, 2011-21

Source: Reproduced from the source in Note 1.

present a broad, up-to-date picture of the CEFT’s
ever-growing scope of routes linking a massive
network of cities and their underlying logistical
and economic strengths that are capable of countering the disruption caused by the Ukraine war.
CONNECTIVE SPEED, SCOPE, AND STRENGTH
Any large-scale transport system takes a long
time to develop and mature. The CEFT may be
an exception in that it has expanded rapidly
and extensively over a mere decade, from a few
places into arguably the world’s largest logistics
network linking hundreds of cities across the
vast continent of Eurasia, as the most prominent
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FIGURE 2

A freight train loaded with personal protective equipment
(PPE) leaving Xi’an for Milan in 2020 and the cumulative
number of China-Europe freight trains through August 2022

Source: Image from China Global Television Network (21 August 2022);
the statistical figure is from the Exploring New Silk Road WeChat
account (14 September 2022).
MAP 1

The main China-Europe freight train routes

Source: Chen (2021: Figure 3).

flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), launched in 2013. While this combination of speed and scope hints at the CEFT’s
potential lack of coherence and sustainability,
it has secured a level of regularity and stability
from its rapid growth and extensive coverage of
numerous shipping rail routes and train schedules that may yield flexibility when faced with
risks like the war in Ukraine.

The CEFT started when the megacity of
Chongqing in southwestern China sent a maiden
freight train to Duisburg, Germany, through
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and Poland on 19
March 2011. A return train from Duisburg did not
arrive back in Chongqing until March 2013, marking
the first-ever eastbound run. One year later, in
2014, shortly after the inauguration of the BRI,
China’s President Xi Jinping greeted a train from
Chongqing when he visited Duisburg, which accelerated the growth of the CEFT. By the end of 2021, a
total of 49,000 freight trains had run between China
and Europe, carrying 4.4 million containers. The
fastest growth occurred in 2020, at 50 per cent and
56 per cent in numbers of trains and containers,
respectively, over 2019. This growth was fuelled
by the pandemic-induced disruption to maritime
shipping and Europe’s strong demand for Chinamade personal protective equipment (PPE) during
the first wave of COVID-19. The runs also became
more balanced as the number of eastbound trains
as a proportion of westbound ones rose from
50.6 per cent per cent in 2016 to 81.5 per cent in
2021 (figure 1). By 1 September 2022, the cumulative number of CEFTs had reached around 59,436
(figure 2), which carried over 5 million containers
with cargo worth nearly $300 billion and covering
50,000 types of goods.2
As the CEFT has grown rapidly, it has expanded
broadly to cover the entire Eurasian landmass.
By 1 September 2022, the CEFT ran on 82 routes
along three main corridors between nearly 100
Chinese cities and around 200 cities across 24
European countries and a number of Central,
East, and Southeast Asian countries neighbouring China (map 1). Every day, these cities
send, receive, or transit around 40 freight trains
running across Eurasia. To facilitate timely shuffling of empty containers, China Railway Co. has
set up 87 container-return yards in 18 countries
covering most of the CEFT hubs outside China.
Many Chinese companies have established logistics distribution centres along the CEFT routes.
For example, the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe
Co. has built an overseas logistics redistribution
facility in Duisburg, sustaining the two cities’
decade-long freight train service. In 2021, the
number of trains at Duisburg’s rail port peaked at
about 70 for a short time, while averaging 60 trains
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a week, compared with only a dozen trains several years
earlier. While Duisburg remains the busiest European hub
for the CEFT, the growing number of routes has brought
more cities into the CEFT’s orbit as indicated by the spread
of trains to more cities. Those cities sending and receiving
more than 100 CEFTs as a share of all trains dropped from
89 per cent in 2017 to 81.4 per cent in 2021.3
Despite its explicit geographic reference to China-Europe,
the CEFT has expanded to a growing number of direct or
extended routes between China and Central Asia in the early
stages, and East Asia-China-Central Asia more recently. In
August 2020, China’s eastern city of Wuxi (Jiangsu Province)
sent its first freight train via the port of Lianyungang to
Uzbekistan loaded with locally manufactured products like
consumer electronics and car parts, in response to uncertain
and high costs and the unpredictable weather for sea shipping.
In 2022, the first sea-rail-road multimodal route carried new
Japanese cars from the port of Yokohama to the major port
city of Tianjin in northern China. From there, a block train
of Chinese-designed JSQ freight vehicle wagons with doubledecker racks, each of which can hold 8-12 cars instead of 3-4
cars for a conventional boxcar, shipped the new cars via Xi’an
and Horgos to the Kazakh border rail terminus of Altynkol.
From there, the new cars were trucked to their destination
of Almaty. This illustrates Xi’an’s established position and role
as China’s largest inland port for moving new and used vehicles. It features a special route to the port of Ghent, Belgium
for shipping new cars, especially Volvos between China and
Europe with the more economical, China-made model XC60
going to Europe, and the more luxurious and expensive XC90
from Europe back to China. By the end of 2021, the Xi’anbased CEFT (Chang’an Express) ran 739 block trains carrying
83,600 new cars, 315 westbound trains with 41,411 cars and
424 eastbound trains with 42,189 cars, including such international brands as Audi, the Chinese electric carmaker BYD
(Build Your Dreams), and Peugeot S.A., besides Volvo.4
On a broader geographic scale, by 29 August 2022,
the International Land-Sea Transport Corridor (ILSTC),
anchored to and through Chongqing as its centre of operation and established in 2017, channelled more than
20,000 freight trains between Europe and Southeast Asia
via China and between western China and Southeast Asia,
terminating in Singapore. Within China, this corridor
has incorporated 111 rail hubs associated with 59 cities
and 29 ports across 16 provinces into an ever-expanding
domestic/international logistics network functioning as a
transcontinental transport corridor.5
Beyond and through China, this land-sea corridor has
extended more freight connections back and forth to nearly
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100 cities in 19 countries between Europe-China and Southeast
Asia through China’s overland neighbours of Vietnam, Laos,
and Myanmar via Yunnan Province. The traffic has grown
from the increasing use of the existing China-Vietnam
Railway, and since the opening of the China-Laos Railway on
23 December 2021, and 1 January 2022, when the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) took effect.
Since 2017, the value of traded cargo carried through the
ILSTC to ASEAN has amounted to approximately $116 billion,
which accounts for 33 per cent of the total amount of trade
between China’s provinces and cities and ASEAN along the
corridor.6 Even beyond the ILSTC via Chongqing, the CEFT
(Chang’an Express) has begun to ship asbestos regularly
from Central Asia and Russia through Kazakhstan to Vietnam
overland, saving 50 per cent in transit time and 20 per cent
in shipping cost over the traditional rail-sea route via one of
China’s main east-coast ports.
This increasingly varied and stretched set of freight
routes has both extended and diversified the geographic
boundary and coverage of the CEFT, pushing more cargo
to flow back and forth between China and Central Asia,
between East and Central Asia via China, and between
Europe and Southeast Asia through western China. This
has also sharpened China’s location advantages in recombining its land and sea transport access and capacity to
expand its economic reach and power through the CEFT
as a transcontinental logistics network. As this network
becomes even more Eurasian geographically and more
intermodal, it is poised to carry more Europe-Asia trade,
the world's largest bi-regional flow, although the bulk of
that trade will continue to travel by sea.
FROM REACH TO IMPACT
The CEFT’s vast geographic reach has created new mechanisms for exerting positive impact on countries and cities
along the routes. First, while Russia, the former Soviet states,
and China use the Agreement on International Goods Traffic
by Rail (SMGS), Europe uses the Rail Transport Document
(CIM) consignment, which creates some incompatibility
between two separate rounds of paperwork for international
rail transport across borders. The CEFT has partly unified
those two protocols by allowing a number of such CEFT hubs
as Chongqing and Xi’an to adopt a unified scheme to send
and receive cargo shipments with a single round of paperwork between origins and destinations. This cooperation has
facilitated the inclusion of postal packages in the CEFT cargo,
which has extended this new international postal service
from the Chongqing-Duisburg line to routes linking 36 Asian
and European countries. This led to the running of 22 postal
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block trains carrying 10,000 tons of mail packages after COVID-19.7 On 16 September 2022, the
CEFT (Chang’an Express)’s first-ever block train
of postal packages left Xi’an for Małaszewicze, a
key CEFT hub on the Polish side of the border
with Belarus, and arrived in 12 days. From there,
the Polish postal authorities sent on the packages to their recipients throughout the EU within
30 days, considerably faster than the estimated
60 days from origin to destination by sea and at a
fraction of the cost for air shipping.
To improve border-crossing efficiency, the
CEFT has brought together several of China’s
interior hubs like Xi’an and border gateways
such as Horgos with Ghent (Belgium), Gödöllő
(Hungry), Małaszewicze, and Rotterdam in
adopting the “safe and smart trade” and the
“customs-rail connect” programmes. In 2021,
the Chinese and Kazakh customs authorities
agreed to set up the combined “customs-rail
through” clearing scheme to simplify and
speed up the heavy cross-border flow of CEFTs
and China-Central Asian trains, which highlighted and reinforced Kazakhstan as the most
critical crossroads for trains going both west
and east, together with Russia.
In August 2022, the Bank of Chongqing
completed the first transaction of derivative
trading on a new online financial platform with
Singapore, which created convenient payment
and financing for trade and logistics companies shipping along the ILSTC described above.
It has set up S$20 million to be swapped with
Chinese yuan in advancing or settling international cargo payments by various parties
based in Chongqing and its neighbouring provinces and cities. This financial innovation also
reinforces an existing financing mechanism
that has raised $373 million for small trading
and logistics firms to advance and settle cargo
payments since 2019. In addition, the Bank
of Chongqing has leveraged this new international financial programme in targeting key
local logistics companies for sustained financial backing that has amounted to $87 million
since 2019.8 The combination of these older
and new financing improvements has provided
a big boost to the Chongqing-anchored transnational corridor linking Europe with Asia.

The CEFT with its Asian freight
connections would not be able
to operate as a transcontinental
shipping network without these
cooperative mechanisms.
The CEFT with its Asian freight connections would not be able to operate as a
transcontinental shipping network without
these cooperative mechanisms. With smoother
border-clearing and efficient processing of
paperwork, the CEFT has enhanced regional
integration, trade growth, industrial development, and consumption along and beyond
the routes. The most important Central Asian
country for connecting China with Europe,
Kazakhstan, has secured new access to international trade by exporting its high-quality wheat
to Southeast Asia, which would not otherwise be possible due its landlocked location.
Leveraging its CEFT hub position, the megacity
of Chengdu near Chongqing has raised its
number of export-oriented companies from a
few to nearly 50,000, including those that send
both locally assembled cars and traditional
agricultural products to European markets
on its regularised westbound trains. This has
been reflected in the rapid growth of combined
trade from and to China’s central and western
regions, which rose 2.5 times from 2011 to 2021
and whose share of the national total increased
from 12 per cent to 17 per cent. Export-oriented
industrial enterprises based on Chongqing
and Zhengzhou, another CEFT hub in Henan
Province in central China, grew their output by
30 per cent annually.9
In the opposite direction, the CEFT carries a
growing variety of popular European consumer
goods such as Dutch dairy products, French
cosmetics and red wines, Italian clothing, and
German luxury cars to China, where there
is a high demand for these imports. This is
not surprising, as China has become a huge
consuming nation, whose share of global
consumption rose from 9 per cent during
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2000-5 to 23 per cent during 2013-18. As the CEFT
has opened up more avenues for European goods
to reach China, it helped drive China’s imports from
the EU and east-central Europe to grow at 63.7 per
cent and 127.3 per cent during 2016-21.10 China’s
railway trade with Europe rose from $8 billion of
goods in 2016 to about $75 billion in 2021, which
accounted for around 9 per cent of the total ChinaEurope trade. The CEFT’s favourable trade effect
has spread beyond the China-Europe dyad to the
China-Central Asia and other intra-Asia segments
of the expanded Eurasian trading network. In
May 2022, Guangxi Province, a major sugar cane
producing region in China, sent a block train fully
loaded with sugar to Kazakhstan in 11 days. In the
opposite direction, Uzbekistan can export fertilisers to Malaysia via rail-sea shipping through
western China to the port of Qinzhou in Guangxi
for onward seaborne shipping.
Greater trade along more connected and
cost-effective transport routes facilitates more
industrial investment and development, leading
to more efficiently organised production and
supply chains. Freight train costs one-fifth of
air shipping and takes a quarter of the time of
maritime shipping. Factoring in time cost for
transporting high-value-added products, freight
train cuts 8-20 per cent of the total logistics costs
for combined rail-sea shipping, with less vulnerability to external environmental conditions and
more operating stability. These advantages have
contributed to the CEFT’s appeal to large global
manufacturers such as Dell, Lenovo, and TCL (a
large Chinese electronics company headquartered in Huizhou, Guangdong Province), which
have reorganised their supply chains around key
CEFT hubs and along key shipping routes.
Finally, the CEFT, by creating more routes
between pairs of regions, has contributed to the
establishment of new sister-province relations
between Shaanxi Province and Kaluzhskaya
Oblast, Russia and Jambyl or Zhambyl Region,
Kazakhstan, and between Jiangsu Province and
North Brabant, the Netherlands. As a result of
frequent inter-city train services, friendship-city
cooperation has formed between Chengdu and
Duisburg, Vienna, and Milan, between Chongqing
and Dusseldorf, Hamburg, and Budapest, and
between Wuhan and Lyon and Bordeaux,11 from
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where the CEFT carries the famed French red
wine to China. Xinjiang Region has recently
agreed to set up friendship-region relations with
four regions in eastern Kazakhstan bordering
China, signalling the particularly close trade and
logistics ties between two neighbouring regions
as crucial subnational connected segments of the
CEFT. Playing off its status, a major CEFT hub,
China’s city of Xi’an, has recently used the thirtieth
anniversary of its friendship-city relations with
Dortmund to run a summer football programme
for local youth with the German city’s coaches.
These new inter-regional and inter-local government relations not only strengthen the logistics
ties between these CEFT hubs and their immediate hinterlands but also promote other areas of
regional and local cross-border cooperation.
Looking back at its first decade of existence, the
CEFT has developed rapidly and extensively into
a transcontinental freight network from a convergence of top-down and bottom-up initiatives and
programmes across many international boundaries. It has created a strong synergistic driving
force behind a large number of freight trains to and
from numerous cities and regions that add up to a
substantial volume of traded goods across Eurasia,
the largest region of gravity of the global economy.
Fully integrated or not as a logistics system, the
CEFT possesses a maturing degree of stability and
flexibility in the face of the war in Ukraine as a
potentially longer-term risk to its operation.
THE DISRUPTION OF THE WAR AND THE
ADAPTATION OF THE CEFT
Even before the Ukrainian crisis, the CEFT’s large
systemic scale, wide geographic reach, and operational complexity presented obstacles including
uneven demand and load distributions across all
routes, pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, some traffic congestion at a small number
of crucial border crossings like Małaszewicze,
Poland, and lagging development of logistical
infrastructure at some hubs to support heavy train
flows. Leading up to the war, some CEFT routes
were already slowing down as weaker demand for
rail shipping and lower freight prices had arisen
from more countries resuming their own production upon exiting COVID-19 and thus needing less
exports from China, as well as reduced sea freight

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 2022

The CEFT’s
strong recovery
from and
response to the
disruption of
the war reflect
its flexibility
and adaptability
embedded in
its enlarged
geographic
coverage
and unevenly
distributed
access to
alternative
routes.

costs as a re-energised competition with the CEFT as most
COVID-induced port congestions eased.
Yet none of these is as challenging as Russia’s war
against Ukraine, considering that a large amount of railcargo has continued to pass through Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Belarus, with 68 per cent of the westbound traffic and
82 per cent of the eastbound traffic in China-EU overland
trade through Russia in 2021. Soon after the West imposed
sanctions on Russia, especially with Russian railways on
the sanction list, many China-based European and US
manufacturers and traders suspended orders for shipping
on the CEFT, while some sought cargo insurance packages
that cover war risks, which is not usually covered by the
standard freight insurance. The war, for example, led the
German carmaker Audi, which has extensive supply chains
to and in China, to stop using the Trans-Siberian Railway.
While Ukraine did not join the CEFT until 2020 and
accounted for only 0.2 per cent of the CEFT flows by the
end of 2021, a small number of CEFTs ran from Russia
through Kiev and Chop, a Ukrainian city near Slovakia and
Hungary, into the EU. This route was suspended indefinitely
after the war in Ukraine started. By early April 2022, the
freight volume from China to Europe was down by about
50 per cent compared with before the war.12 More specifically, market demand for freight trains from Shanghai
to such key European cities as Hamburg, also a sister-city
with Shanghai, fell by 40 per cent in the first month of the
war, with the frequency of trains halved.13 It is tempting
to inflate this short-term shock into a larger and longer
impact, especially since the war and its broader spillover
geopolitics appear to escalate and persist.
Despite all the war-induced disruptions, it did not take
long for the CEFT to stabilise its operation and regain
momentum. Even in the war’s immediate aftermath during

Source: The Chang'an Express WeChat account, 10 September, 2022.

March and April 2022, the number of CEFTs averaged
around 1,100, above the mean over the last three years.
By May and June 2022, the number of trains rose to over
1,300, comparable to the monthly high in 2021. July and
August 2022 saw new historic records of 1,517 and 1,601
trains, respectively, the latter of which was up 21 per cent
in year-over-year (YOY) growth.14 On 21 August 2022, a
freight train departed Xi’an and arrived in Hamburg on
9 September through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and
Poland, along the earliest and most established route that
was supposedly the most vulnerable to the spillover risk
of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It marked the 10,000th CEFT for
the year (see image below) and hit this neat target 10 days
ahead of the pace for 2021, carrying 972,000 containers at
5 per cent in YOY growth.15 While the total of 10,000 trains
may have caught media attention, the Xi’an-Hamburg train
was functionally and connectively important. Its cargo
featured titanium-plate-based liquid crystal display (LCD)
panels made in Xi’an for Europe. Its route linked Xi’an as
the eastern end of the ancient Silk Road and a 21st-century
global logistics hub, with Hamburg as Germany’s largest
comprehensive port. Hamburg is also Europe’s leading rail
port, as the Port of Hamburg has a track network of about
300 kilometres, which efficiently handles around 200 freight
trains with over 5,500 wagons daily.
The CEFT’s strong recovery from and response to
the disruption of the war reflect its flexibility and adaptability embedded in its enlarged geographic coverage and
unevenly distributed access to alternative routes. As one
form of response, some rail shipping companies and freight
forwarders, primarily those based in China, have turned to
main alternative routes along the network of roads, railroads, and ports stretching across Kazakhstan, the Caspian
Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey into Europe, or what
is known as the CEFT’s Middle or Southern Corridor.
Cargo shipments across Central Asia and the Caucasus are
expected to reach 3.2 million metric tons in 2022, a sixfold
increase over 2021. A small and growing number of CEFTs
from such established hubs as Chongqing and Xi’an have
crossed the Black Sea into Europe via intermodal shipping
through the Romanian Port of Constanta into the EU (the
two dotted lines, map 1 and also see map 2).
One of the first companies to use the Middle Corridor,
TopRail, a Romania-based logistics freight forwarding
company with regular cargoes to and across Europe from
China, reported a 22-day journey from Suzhou in eastern
China to the Georgian port of Poti in April 2022, a record
transit time. The company ran more trains in May, using
Constanta as a gateway into Europe, with train dispatches
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MAP 2

The China-Europe freight train crosses both
the Caspian and Black Seas

Source: Silk Road Briefing, the Asia Briefing Weekly.

to France and additional stops in Germany. While
this adaptability was not envisioned and built into
the original CEFT system, the latter’s established
routes have fostered and signalled opportunities for alternative routes via land-sea shipping to
bypass the pacing risks of the war in Ukraine.
The main alternative route has also spun off
and stimulated spur lines through Central Asia
that otherwise might not take shape. One such
line has brought the reclusive Central Asian
country of Turkmenistan into the CEFT with its
China-Central Asia segments. In transiting a part
of Kazakhstan, a train from China to Europe can
pass by Almaty and head west through Shymkent
before heading south into Tashkent, with onward
connections to Turkmenistan via Samarkand
before reaching Turkmenistan’s Caspian Sea port
of Türkmenbaşy (map 1). The latter is 300 km
closer to Baku than sailing from the Kazakh port
of Aktau. In the first eight months of 2022, cargo
from China, via Kazakhstan, through Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, increased 400 per cent, while
rail cargo volumes between Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan reached more than 1.38 million
tons over that period.16
In the opposite direction from Central Asia to
China, on 31 August 2022, a barge loaded with highquality locally grown licorice, a common ingredient
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for traditional Chinese medicine from the eastern
Turkmen city of Türkmenabad, left Türkmenbaşy
for Aktau, where the cargo was put on a block
train that arrived in Xi’an in 22 days, covering
7,562 kilometres. This first-ever return train from
Turkmenistan to Xi’an exemplifies the two countries’
transport cooperation following the second ChinaCentral Asia Foreign Ministers meeting in 2021. The
new China-Kazakhstan communique commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of diplomatic
relations, was unveiled on 14 September 2022 in
Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana), capital of Kazakhstan,
where Xi Jinping had announced the Silk Road
Economic Belt of the BRI in 2013 and made his firstever international visit after the pandemic. There,
he unveiled the development of a new KazakhstanTurkmenistan-Iran rail corridor, the equalising of
its through customs and transport tariffs, and the
upgrading of Aktau port to help ease the rail-sea
crossing over the Caspian Sea. The agreed feasibility
study was also signed on 14 September 2022 on the
sidelines of the most recent summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Uzbekistan.
Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan
Railway, beginning in 2023, would eventually link
up with railways through Turkmenistan, Iran, and
Turkey to Europe. Having just joined the SCO as its
newest member country, Iran announced that it
would explore creating a direct freight rail link from
Tehran all the way east to Shanghai.
These alternative or new freight routes will
shorten the freight journey from China to Europe
and the Middle East and cut several days off the
travel time as the shortest-possible route. In the
short term, it helps the CEFT weather the war in
Ukraine along round-about routes. In the longer
run, it will incorporate partly or fully into the
CEFT’s widening geographic orbit such Caucasian,
Central, and West Asian countries as Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Iran, and Turkey, and their nodal cities like Baku,
Tbilisi, Bishkek, Tashkent, Ashgabat, Tehran, and
Istanbul, plus some of their smaller and secondary
cities (maps 1 and 2).
Adaptive as the CEFT has shown itself to be, it
can’t avoid the known and latent roadblocks along
the alternative routes. Whether crossing both seas
or just one, “going south” from Kazakhstan instead
of west through Russia is more time-consuming and

less cost-effective, due to the longer distance and
more complicated land-sea intermodal shipping.
For one thing, some Kazakhstan-based European
companies attempt to bypass Russia, which slows
down Chinese cargo destined for Europe through
Kazakhstan. For another, a very limited number of
barges are available to carry containers offloaded
from trains from the Kazakh port of Aktau to Baku
across the Caspian Sea. It often takes a full week for
the offloaded containers to get on a barge at Aktau.
Since there is usually only one barge carrying cargo
from Poti to Constanta over the Black Sea once every
10 days, it means a wait of 10 days if a freight train
misses that one ship service that partly decouples
the rail-sea shipping. By helping war-torn Ukraine
transship grain out, the port of Constanta lacks sufficient port and rail capacities for moving Chinese
cargo. These barriers lengthen the entire CEFT
trip from around 15 days along the Kazak-Russian
route to approximately 40-50 days, with some CEFT
shipments getting stuck in Constanta for around 20
days. They also expose the constraint of such bottlenecks as the underdeveloped facilities at crucial rail
crossings and transit ports across partially incompatible logistics systems over multiple international
boundaries, further complicated by contentious
geopolitics. On top of all, the CEFT has a long way to
go in speeding up from its current average speed of
20-30 km/hour across the Eurasian landmass.
These difficulties aside, the CEFT has created
favourable conditions from its decade-long run for
the incorporation of more countries and cities along
the main routes, which could in turn lead to new
solutions to the new, war-induced challenges. This
contributes to the regional spread of trade flows
and logistics ties conducive to new opportunities for
economic cooperation among newly linked national
and local places and spaces across Eurasia. As a
recent example, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Romania
have discussed making land-sea border-crossing
and tariffs more convenient and compatible, like
the more harmonised overland border crossing
between China and Kazakhstan and between Russia/
Belarus and Poland before the war in Ukraine.

RUNNING AGAINST AND AROUND
GEOPOLITICAL AND OTHER ROADBLOCKS
The CEFT is a historic triumph in transcontinental shipping. It has demonstrated several
comparative and competitive advantages and
strengths in the face of geopolitical risks such as
the war in Ukraine and other geoeconomic and
technical challenges. Its wide territorial coverage,
buttressed by a large and diverse network of
routes and cities, creates an extensive range
of logistics connections capable of redirecting
cargo flows to some alternative geographic paths
where existing rail lines can be linked across new
border crossings. The 200-plus cities across the
CEFT offer a wide and deep grounding for subnational and local governments to play active and
responsive roles in supporting inter-city cargo
shipments through their jurisdictions, without
being centrally exposed to the geopolitical winds
blowing at the inter-state level.
The German city of Duisburg, the busiest CEFT
hub in Europe, has both an Office of China Affairs
and a commissioner for China affairs at the office
of the mayor, who happens to be a former CEO of
the port authorities of Duisburg, or Duisport, to
oversee and coordinate all China-related activities
led by and extended from the CEFT. This reflects a
special kind and degree of local autonomy largely
shielded off from the macro-geopolitical currents
hitting China-EU relations. In China, a number
of proactive municipal governments of such key
CEFT hubs in China as Xi’an offered war insurance
to shippers who were hesitant to run their cargo
through Russia in the early days and months of the
war. This financial assistance or subsidy has been a
key factor in keeping some trains running along the
Russian route while prompting the CEFT’s war-triggered slowdown to pick up steam again later.
The war’s negative impact has also been mitigated by other recent developments at the European
end of the CEFT routes. Strikes at a number of
European ports have recently created congestions, which in turn have increased the stronger
appeal of the CEFT’s time-saving and cost-effective
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advantages. At the same time, the small number of small
crucial points for westbound CEFTs to enter western Europe,
such as Małaszewicze near the border with Belarus, are irreplaceable. This Polish border town’s limited physical size
and logistics facilities need upgrades to ease congestion due
to the steady stream of freight trains from China via Russia
and Belarus through the war.
As the westbound CEFTs continue to run through the war’s
geopolitical risks, accompanied by some existing short- and
longer-term barriers, the CEFT system has shifted some
gravity of its operation further east, pulled by the sum of the
much more expansive Asian side of the Eurasian landmass,
the weightier Asian economic region, the greater extension
of the intra-Asian rail-sea routes, and the recent geopolitical shifts that help strengthen China-Russia economic
relations as the war in Ukraine continues. As mentioned
earlier, the CEFT now encompasses an increasing number
of China-Central Asia, China-Southeast Asia, and East AsiaChina-Europe intermodal routes beyond the original smaller
set of China-Europe rail-only routes via Central Asia. While
maintaining generally strong ties with Russia through the
Eurasian Economic Union, the Central Asian countries have
turned more to China, as reflected in the growing number of
freight rail routes linking them. The CEFT’s originator and
most powerful driver, China has pushed the logistics flows
through the CEFT further east and south by enhancing its
middle role in channelling intermodal shipping between
Europe and Asia through its western region.
As the war in Ukraine poses continued risks for throughRussia freight traffic, the number of China-Russia freight
trains and their loaded containers, primarily via the Eastern
route (map 1), grew 16.4 per cent and 16.2 per cent, respectively, over the first seven months of 2022. This reflects the
growth of overall China-Russia trade, which amounted to
$97.7 billion over this period, up 29 per cent from the corresponding period of 2021.17 As a good number of Western
companies have left Russia in response to the imposition
of severe sanctions, China has exported more cars, mobile
phones, and varied consumer goods to Russia. Besides
freight trains from western China to western Russia, the
greater proportion of China’s exports has entered Russia
via a number of cross-border transport corridors linking
China’s northeast to Russia’s Far East (map 3), with a recently
opened cross-border rail and a road bridge between the
Chinese border city of Heihe and its Russian counterpart
of Blagoveshchensk, a new transport corridor that parallels
the CEFT’s Eastern route (map 1).
The current cargo shipments from eastern China
remain somewhat limited, due to its zero-COVID border
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MAP 3

The Russian Far East’s Cross-Border Transport
Corridors with China

Source: The Exploring New Silk Road WeChat
account (8 September 2022).

control, the lack of logistics facilities, and the shortage of
trucks on the Russian side. In the longer run, these transport corridors are likely to carry more cross-border trade
as Russia shifts more economic development priority to
its Far Eastern region to lessen its head-on confrontation
with Western Europe, as indicated by Putin’s speech at the
7th Eastern Economic Forum held on 5-8 September 2022
in the geographically fitting city of Vladivostok. In addition, the upgrading of the cross-border railway along the
BRI’s China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor, agreed
at the SCO Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 15-16
September 2022, will strengthen the CEFT’s Middle route
(map 1). These developments may pull the eastern end
of the CEFT further east, which in turn could reinforce
Russia’s position as a wide crossroads for Eurasian trade,
reducing some dependence on Kazakhstan’s crucial passthrough location for China’s westbound trains.
Finally, to the extent that the war in Ukraine poses both
geopolitical and logistical risks to the CEFT, geopolitics
looms and lurks much larger from the western end of Eurasia
than at its eastern edge, where the close China-Russia partnership has translated into greater cross-border trade and
freight. Between both ends of Eurasia, the CEFT has spun
a wide web of freight routes extending the China-Europe
rail links among their major cities to a much larger number
of logistics hubs and their secondary feeders and regional
hinterlands across Central, East, and Southeast Asia. While
some new routes within and across this transcontinental
shipping network may not stabilise with regularised freight
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service until later, the system has already reached
its irreplaceable level of long-term continuity
regardless of any short-term disruptions. Riding
on its large scope and strong connectivity, the
CEFT has weathered the earlier shocks of Russia’s
war against Ukraine and is capable of responding
to other challenges. This resilience bodes well for
the CEFT to continue functioning as a dynamic
transcontinental freight system as it runs into and
through its second decade toward 2031.
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